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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Patricia Flores, a native and citizen of Guatemala, 
seeks review of a decision by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) that found her ineligible for withholding of 
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removal because she had been convicted of a “particularly 
serious crime”—namely, she was convicted of accessory after 
the fact in South Carolina for witnessing, but failing to report, 
a murder.  Flores now petitions for review, contending that 
her South Carolina conviction does not constitute a 
“particularly serious crime” under our decision in Denis v. 
Attorney General, and that she should therefore be eligible for 
withholding of removal.  We agree.  Because Flores’s South 
Carolina accessory-after-the-fact conviction is not an offense 
“relating to obstruction of justice,” it cannot be considered 
either an “aggravated felony” or a “particularly serious 
crime” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  
Accordingly, Flores is eligible for withholding of removal. 
I. 
Flores, a Guatemalan native, originally entered the 
United States with her husband to escape her abusive father.  
Although her husband traveled with a visa, she entered the 
country illegally.  The two had a daughter together, but 
subsequently divorced, and Flores entered various 
relationships with other men and women. 
According to the record on appeal, Flores traveled 
to South Carolina to visit family in late 2007.  While there, 
she struck up a relationship with a young man, Fredy Sibrian.  
Unfortunately, this relationship soon deteriorated as Sibrian 
became increasingly “violent, jealous and possessive,” 
causing Flores to leave Sibrian.1  She then traveled to North 
Carolina, where she met, and started dating, another man, 
Antonio Perez.  When Flores subsequently returned to South 
Carolina with Perez in April 2008, Sibrian confronted them at 
a gas station, causing a heated exchange that ended when 
                                                   
1 App. at 316. 
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Sibrian shot and killed Perez.  According to Flores, she did 
not immediately report the murder because Sibrian threatened 
to kill her and her then-three-year-old daughter if she 
disclosed Sibrian’s actions to the police.  Fearing Sibrian’s 
retribution, Flores returned to North Carolina, but she was 
later arrested and sent back to South Carolina, where she was 
charged with Perez’s murder.  
Flores eventually pleaded guilty to accessory after 
the fact under South Carolina law2 and was sentenced to five 
years’ imprisonment.  According to Flores’s testimony, which 
the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found credible, she pleaded 
guilty to accessory after the fact because she failed to report 
the murder to police.  The record does not reflect that Flores 
covered up the homicide, lied to police or prosecutors, or 
assisted the shooter in any way. 
After serving about two years of her prison term, 
Flores was removed to Guatemala.  A few months later, 
however, she re-entered the United States illegally.  In 2015, 
following her arrest for prostitution, Flores was detained by 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  During an asylum 
interview, she stated that she feared returning to Guatemala 
because: (1) her father, who had physically and sexually 
abused her as a child, wanted to kill her; (2) she had been 
raped by members of a local gang immediately following her 
previous removal to Guatemala; and (3) she feared that she 
would be persecuted because she is a lesbian.  The asylum 
officer determined that Flores had a reasonable fear of 
persecution. 
The case was referred to the Immigration Court 
where Flores filed an application for withholding of removal 
                                                   
2 S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-55. 
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and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  
The IJ made two primary findings with respect to Flores.  
First, the IJ found that Flores’s conviction for accessory after 
the fact was a “particularly serious crime” under the INA, 
rendering her ineligible for withholding of removal.  Second, 
the IJ found that Flores failed to adequately establish that she 
would, more likely than not, be subjected to torture in 
Guatemala, as required to obtain relief under CAT.  Flores 
then appealed to the BIA. 
The BIA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the IJ’s 
decision on both grounds.  First, relying on its own decisions 
and our holding in Denis,3 the BIA concluded that Flores’s 
accessory-after-the-fact conviction “relat[es] to obstruction of 
justice,” and therefore constitutes a “particularly serious 
crime.” 4   The BIA also concluded that Flores had not 
meaningfully challenged the denial of her CAT claim because 
she failed to produce any purported new evidence in support 
of her position.  
II.5 
Flores now petitions for review of two BIA 
determinations: (1) that her accessory-after-the-fact 
conviction is a “particularly serious crime” rendering her 
                                                   
3 633 F.3d 201, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a New 
York conviction for evidence tampering was “relat[ed] to” 
obstruction of justice within the meaning of the INA). 
4 App. 30.   
5  The BIA exercised appellate jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3), and we exercise jurisdiction over Flores’s 
petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
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ineligible for withholding of removal,6 and (2) that she did 
not meaningfully challenge the denial of her CAT claim.7  We 
address each in turn.  
A. 
The INA provides that the Attorney General “may 
not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General 
decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in 
that country.” 8   However, such withholding of removal is 
unavailable if the alien committed a “particularly serious 
crime” because, in such a case, the alien is considered a 
“danger to the community of the United States.” 9   A 
“particularly serious crime,” under the INA, includes crimes 
that are considered “aggravated felon[ies]” for which the 
alien received a prison sentence of at least five years.10  The 
INA’s list of aggravated felonies, in turn, includes 21 
descriptions of various offenses, including, as relevant here, 
“offense[s] relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or 
                                                   
6 With respect to this question, we review the BIA’s decision 
de novo.  Denis, 633 F.3d at 209; see also Restrepo v. Att’y 
Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 2010). 
7 With respect to this question, we review factual findings for 
substantial evidence, “which means we must uphold findings 
of fact unless the record evidence compels a contrary 
finding.”  Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 425 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  We review legal conclusions de novo.  Id. 
8 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
9 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
10 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). 
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subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness” (the 
“Obstruction Provision”).11  Because Flores was sentenced to 
five years for her accessory-after-the-fact conviction, the 
question before us is straightforward: is accessory after the 
fact “relat[ed] to obstruction of justice”?  We now answer that 
question in the negative. 
1. 
Our inquiry starts, as it must, with our decision in 
Denis.  There, we examined whether an alien’s prior New 
York conviction for tampering with evidence was an “offense 
relating to obstruction of justice.” 12   In doing so, we first 
explained that we apply the categorical approach of statutory 
interpretation in determining whether a state conviction 
constitutes an aggravated felony (and thus a “particularly 
serious crime”) under the INA.13  This approach involves a 
comparison between the statute of the alien’s prior conviction 
and the relevant federal crime listed as an aggravated felony, 
without regard to the underlying facts of the petitioner’s 
offense.14  If the elements of the alien’s statute of conviction 
are broader than the elements of the aggravated felony crime, 
then the crime of conviction does not qualify as an aggravated 
felony. 15   If, however, the elements of the statute of 
conviction are the same or narrower than the elements of the 
                                                   
11 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). 
12 633 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011). 
13 Id. at 206 (citation omitted).   
14 Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 791. 
15 Denis, 633 F.3d at 206. 
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aggravated felony crime, then the crime of conviction 
qualifies as an aggravated felony.16   
Importantly, unlike other contexts, Denis makes 
clear that, when applying the categorical approach, we do not 
strictly compare the elements of the statute of conviction to 
the elements of the Obstruction Provision’s referenced 
offenses.17  Instead, we apply a looser categorical approach in 
                                                   
16  Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 791.  We may sometimes look 
beyond the mere text of the state statute and employ a 
“modified categorical approach” if the statute is divisible—
i.e., it lists several elements in the alternative, thereby 
defining multiple crimes.  Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2243, 2249 (2016).  In such a case, we may consult “a limited 
class of documents (for example, the indictment, jury 
instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to determine 
what crime, with what elements, a[n alien] was convicted of.”  
Id.  Then, under the modified categorical approach, we 
perform the same comparison as under the categorical 
approach: if the elements of the crime of conviction are 
broader than the elements of the aggravated felony crime, 
then the crime of conviction does not qualify as an aggravated 
felony, and vice versa.  United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 
190 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The modified categorical approach still 
‘retains the categorical approach’s central feature: a focus on 
the elements, rather than the facts, of a crime.’  It simply 
allows a sentencing court ‘to examine a limited class of 
documents to determine which of a statute’s alternative 
elements formed the basis of the defendant’s prior 
conviction.’” (quoting Descamps v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013))). 
17  See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250-51 (using a strict 
categorical approach to compare the elements of generic 
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light of the Obstruction Provision’s statutory text, which 
states that aggravated felonies include any offense “relating 
to obstruction of justice.”18  Thus, “rather than ascertaining 
whether the elements of a [prior] crime of conviction match 
the elements of a generic federal offense with precision, we 
must only decide that the [prior] conviction ‘relates to’ the 
offense criminalized by [the Obstruction Provision], namely, 
obstruction of justice.” 19   In other words, we “survey the 
interrelationship between the [crime committed and the 
relevant obstruction statute], and apply the phrase ‘relating to’ 
broadly, seeking a logical or causal connection.” 20  As the 
“prime example” of this “causal connection,” we remarked 
that “Section 510(b), which criminalizes the knowing 
exchange of stolen or forged Treasury instruments,” is 
“related to” forgery, even though it lacks the “essential 
element” of an intent to defraud or deceive.21  Similarly, we 
noted that a conviction for trafficking in counterfeit items 
                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
burglary and Iowa burglary under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act); Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 (using a strict categorical 
approach to compare the elements of generic burglary and 
California burglary under the Armed Career Criminal Act). 
18 Denis, 633 F.3d at 207 (emphasis in original). 
19 Id. 
20  Id. at 212 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and 
citations omitted).   
21 Id. at 211 (citing Bobb v. Att’y Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 219-20 
(3d Cir. 2006)).   
10 
 
constitutes an aggravated felony “relating to” counterfeiting 
in light of the connection between these two offenses.22  
With those principles in mind, we then turned to 
Denis’s prior New York conviction for tampering with 
evidence.  In reviewing the Obstruction Provision, we 
explained that “Title 18 of the U.S. Code contains a listing of 
crimes entitled ‘obstruction of justice,’ permitting us to easily 
determine the types of conduct Congress intended the phrase 
to encompass.” 23   Looking at that obstruction-of-justice 
section of the U.S. Code—Chapter 73, to be precise—we 
noted that § 1503 and § 1512(c)(1) were most relevant to 
Denis’s conduct. 24   Section 1503 prohibits a person from 
“corruptly or by threats or force . . . influenc[ing], 
obstruct[ing], or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to influence, 
                                                   
22 Id. (citing Park v. Att’y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 72 (3d 
Cir. 2006)). 
23 Id. at 209.  In contrast to other circuits, we do not defer to 
the BIA’s interpretation of the Obstruction Provision in 
making this determination.  Compare Denis, 633 F.3d at 209, 
with Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808, 815 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (noting that the Ninth Circuit had previously 
deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of the obstruction 
provision but declining to do so in light of a subsequent BIA 
decision), and Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 507, 510 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (deferring to the BIA’s interpretation of the 
obstruction provision); see also Higgins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 
97, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2012) (acknowledging a circuit split on 
whether courts defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the 
obstruction provision, but declining to weigh in). 
24 Denis, 633 F.3d at 212. 
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obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice.”25  We 
explained that “Denis’s conviction for tampering bears a 
close resemblance to the federal obstruction of justice offense 
defined in Section 1503” because “[b]oth Denis’s crime of 
conviction and [the Obstruction Provision], by their terms, 
proscribe any behavior that entails the use of force in an effort 
to impede or obstruct an official proceeding, such as through 
evidence tampering.”26  Likewise, § 1512(c)(1) prohibits the 
alteration, destruction, mutilation, or concealment of any 
object that would “impair the object’s integrity or availability 
for use in an official proceeding.” 27  Section 1512(c)(1)’s 
“focus on destroying or mutilating evidentiary items in 
anticipation of their potential production in a prospective 
proceeding,” we observed, “is directly analogous, and thus, 
logically connected to Denis’s state crime of conviction.”28  
Accordingly, we held that New York’s tampering-with-
evidence offense “relat[es] to obstruction of justice” as 
defined in § 1503 and § 1512(c)(1), and therefore constituted 
an aggravated felony within the meaning of the INA.29 
2. 
The Government construes Denis expansively, 
seeking to extend that decision beyond its central holding in 
an effort to reach Flores’s accessory-after-the-fact 
                                                   
25 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). 
26 Denis, 633 F.3d at 212 (footnote omitted). 
27 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1). 
28 Denis, 633 F.3d at 213. 
29 Id. 
12 
 
conviction.30  Specifically, the Government argues that: (1) 
we may use the federal accessory-after-the-fact statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 3, as a suitable basis with which to compare Flores’s 
accessory-after-the-fact conviction, rather than the 
obstruction-of-justice statutes in Chapter 7331; and (2) even 
setting aside the federal accessory-after-the-fact statute, 
Flores’s conviction is connected to “a broad notion of 
‘obstruction of justice’” 32  and therefore falls within the 
Obstruction Provision’s purview.  We reject both contentions. 
The Government first claims that we may look 
beyond Chapter 73 and compare Flores’s conviction to the 
federal accessory-after-the-fact statute, § 3, in order to 
determine whether her offense “relat[es] to obstruction of 
                                                   
30 While Flores’s statute of conviction does not codify the 
elements of accessory after the fact, see S.C. Code Ann. § 16-
1-55, the elements of this offense are well settled under South 
Carolina law.  They are: “(1) the felony has been completed; 
(2) the accused must have knowledge that the principal 
committed the felony; and (3) the accused must harbor or 
assist the principal felon.”  State v. Collins, 495 S.E.2d 202, 
204 (S.C. 1998).  “The assistance or harboring rendered must 
be for the purpose of enabling the principal felon to escape 
detection or arrest.”  State v. Legette, 330 S.E.2d 293, 294 
(S.C. 1985) (citations omitted). 
31 Resp’t’s Br. at 13; Resp’t’s Suppl. Br. at 3.  That statute 
provides: “Whoever, knowing that an offense against the 
United States has been committed, receives, relieves, 
comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent 
his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the 
fact.”  18 U.S.C. § 3. 
32 Resp’t’s Br. at 12. 
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justice.”  Given the similarities between § 3 and South 
Carolina accessory after the fact, the Government argues, 
Flores’s prior conviction constitutes obstruction of justice 
within the meaning of the INA.33  This argument is unavailing 
for three reasons. 
First, Denis straightforwardly tells us that we 
review Chapter 73 to determine whether an alien’s prior 
offense “relat[es] to obstruction of justice.”  In that case, we 
scrutinized the Obstruction Provision and explicitly stated 
that we were “[e]xamining [the alien’s] crime of conviction in 
relation to the federal obstruction of justice offenses codified 
in Section 1501 et seq. [i.e., Chapter 73].”34  Nothing in Denis 
remotely suggested searching the U.S. Code to discover other 
offenses that might qualify as obstruction-of-justice crimes. 
Second, the text of the Obstruction Provision 
indicates Congress’s intention to reference Chapter 73 and 
not, as the Government contends, § 3.  The Obstruction 
Provision facially encompasses all “offense[s] relating to 
obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or 
bribery of a witness.” 35   Importantly, both “perjury and 
subornation of perjury” and “bribery of a witness” reference 
specific chapters of Title 18 and, indeed, specific offenses 
codified therein.36  The first phrase in the list, “obstruction of 
                                                   
33 Resp’t’s Br. at 13. 
34 Denis, 633 F.3d at 212. 
35 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). 
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3)-(4) (criminalizing bribery of a 
witness in Chapter 11, “Bribery, Graft, and Conflicts of 
Interest”); 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (criminalizing perjury in 
14 
 
justice,” seems to follow this same pattern: while it is not tied 
to any specific statute, it is identical to the title of Chapter 73, 
labeled “Obstruction of Justice.”  As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, “[t]itles can be useful devices to resolve doubt 
about the meaning of a statute,” especially where, as here, 
other aspects of the statute indicate the same result.37  Given 
Congress’s linking of the textually adjacent terms—“perjury 
and subornation of perjury” and “bribery of a witness”—with 
their respective chapters, it seems odd that Congress would 
not similarly link the first term in the list, “obstruction of 
justice,” with its identically named chapter.  We therefore do 
not believe Congress engaged in such tortuous drafting. 
Third and relatedly, Congress codified its own 
accessory-after-the-fact statute at 18 U.S.C. § 3, but it placed 
that statute outside the provisions related to obstruction of 
justice.38  If Congress considered § 3 an obstruction-of-justice 
                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
Chapter 79, “Perjury”); 18 U.S.C.§ 1622 (criminalizing 
subornation of perjury in Chapter 79, “Perjury”). 
37 Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1090 (2015) (Alito, 
J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
38 The Government observes that “the Court does not give 
weight to where a statute is codified unless Congress (as 
opposed to the Office of the Law Revision Counsel) 
intentionally placed each statute.”  Resp’t’s Suppl. Br. at 3 
(citing United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98-99 n.4 
(1964)).  True enough.  But this proposition is of no moment 
because Title 18 was enacted as positive law and accordingly 
approved by Congress.  See United States v. Loniello, 610 
15 
 
offense, it presumably would have placed that statute in 
Chapter 73, entitled “Obstruction of Justice,” or referenced § 
3 in the Obstruction Provision.  It did neither.   
Thus, we decline the Government’s invitation to 
look at the federal accessory-after-the-fact offense, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3,39 in determining whether Flores’s offense “relat[es] to 
obstruction of justice.” 
The Government also argues that, even setting 
aside § 3, Flores’s conviction is connected to “a broad notion 
of ‘obstruction of justice’” and therefore falls within the 
Obstruction Provision’s purview. 40  This argument raises a 
                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting Title 18’s enactment in 
positive law); United States v. Falvey, 676 F.2d 871, 874 (1st 
Cir. 1982) (same); United States v. Watson, 570 F.2d 282, 
284 (8th Cir. 1978) (“Congress has [] enacted Title 18 into 
positive law as codified.”). 
39 Even if we were to search beyond Chapter 73 for relevant 
offenses, Flores’s South Carolina conviction is arguably more 
analogous to the federal misprision-of-felony offense, 18 
U.S.C. § 4, than to the federal accessory-after-the-fact 
offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3.  It is therefore far from certain that the 
Government would prevail were we to accept its argument.  
In Re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 894-96 
(BIA 1999) (distinguishing between § 3 and § 4 and finding 
that the former “relat[es] to obstruction of justice” while the 
latter does not). 
40 Resp’t’s Br. at 12. 
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broader question: how close a connection is required between 
an alien’s prior offense and “obstruction of justice” such that 
the former may be considered “relating to obstruction of 
justice”?  We answered that question in Denis and we 
reiterate that holding today: an analysis of specific statutes 
must be employed to determine whether a “logical or causal 
connection” exists between an alien’s prior offense and a 
Chapter 73 offense. 
Our case law identifies a spectrum of possible 
connections that may be made between an alien’s prior 
offense and some federal offense.  On one end of the 
spectrum, we could require a precise match between the 
elements of alien’s prior offense and the elements of one 
specific federal offense.  We rejected this approach in Park, 
where we faced the question of whether an alien’s prior 
offense for trafficking counterfeited goods under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2320 was an aggravated felony “relating to . . . 
counterfeiting.”  The alien sought to compare his § 2320 
conviction with one particular statute, 18 U.S.C. § 471, which 
“criminalizes falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, or 
altering any obligation or other security of the United States 
with intent to defraud.”41  But we precluded such an analysis, 
noting that the INA’s description of offenses “relating to . . . 
counterfeiting” required us to look beyond one statute and 
instead examine a class of criminal statutes related to 
counterfeiting.42 
                                                   
41 Park v. Att’y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal 
alterations and quotation marks omitted). 
42 Id. at 71-72; see also Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144, 
154 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that, in the context of “offense[s] 
‘relating to’ . . . counterfeiting,” the term “relating to” is 
17 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, we could, as the 
Government urges, merely require some connection to “broad 
notions” derived from federal offenses.  But this approach 
was rejected by Denis and would otherwise engender 
uncertainty among those tasked with applying it.  Indeed, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected a similar interpretation of the 
Obstruction Provision in Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch. 43  
That case confronted a new BIA explanation of the 
Obstruction Provision, which stated that, to qualify as an 
aggravated felony, accessory-after-the-fact convictions must 
only involve the “affirmative and intentional attempt, 
motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of 
justice,” regardless of the existence of an ongoing 
investigation or proceeding.44  The Ninth Circuit declined to 
follow this interpretation because it “raises serious 
constitutional concerns about whether the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague.”45  Specifically, the court found that 
this “construction leaves grave uncertainty about the plethora 
of steps before and after an ‘ongoing criminal investigation or 
trial’ that comprise ‘the process of justice,’ and, hence, 
                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
used “to define aggravated felonies by reference to 
the general subject of the offense of conviction, suggesting 
Congress’s intent to reach more broadly than any single 
statute” (emphasis added)). 
43 818 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 2016).   
44 Id. at 819 (quoting In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 838, 842 (BIA 2012)). 
45 Id. at 811.   
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uncertainty about which crimes constitute ‘obstruction of 
justice.’”46  While the Ninth Circuit’s decision is not wholly 
applicable to our case,47 its point is well taken: adopting a 
construction of the Obstruction Provision that reaches 
unknowable offenses 48  based on “broad notion[s] of 
‘obstruction of justice’” causes confusion for courts, 
puzzlement for practitioners, and incomprehension for 
immigrants.49  
                                                   
46 Id. at 820 (quoting Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 
842).  This would not only leave courts “unable to determine 
what crimes make a criminal defendant deportable under [the 
Obstruction Provision] and what crimes do not,” but would 
also leave “defense lawyers . . . unable to accurately advise 
their clients about the immigration-related consequences of a 
conviction or plea agreement.”  Id. at 820-21 (citations 
omitted).   
47  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, we do not defer to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the Obstruction Provision.  Denis, 633 F.3d 
at 209.   
48 Would “broad notion[s] of ‘obstruction of justice’” cover, 
for example, money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956)?  False 
statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001)?  Smuggling (18 U.S.C. § 
545)? 
49  So while the phrase “relating to” in the Obstruction 
Provision is certainly broad, we are mindful of both the 
Supreme Court’s warning that these words, “extended to the 
furthest stretch of their indeterminacy, stop nowhere,” and the 
consequences thereof.  Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 
1990 (2015) (alterations omitted) (citing N.Y. State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)). 
19 
 
Recognizing these concerns, Denis adopted a 
categorical approach somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum: while “[w]e need not determine the precise degree 
of similarity between the elements of [an alien’s] offense and 
a listed federal crime,” 50  we must “survey the 
interrelationship between the two statutory provisions and 
apply the phrase ‘relating to’ broadly, seeking a logical or 
causal connection.”51  This requirement of a “logical or causal 
connection” is derived from Bobb,52 where we adopted the 
dictionary definition of “relate,” which means “to show 
or establish a logical or causal connection between.” 53   In 
Bobb, and again in Denis, we stressed the “causality” prong 
of this definition, explaining by way of example that the 
knowing exchange of stolen or forged Treasury instruments is 
“relat[ed] to” forgery because, “but for the forged 
endorsement, there would be no criminal offense.” 54   For 
similar reasons, we found in Park that a conviction for 
trafficking in counterfeit items constituted an aggravated 
felony “relating to . . . counterfeiting.”55  Therefore, a “causal 
                                                   
50 Denis, 633 F.3d at 212. 
51 Id. (citations and some quotation marks omitted). 
52 458 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2006). 
53  Id. at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) 
1916 (1991)). 
54  Id.; see Denis, 633 F.3d at 211-12 (citing Bobb for the 
proposition that a “‘causal connection’ may suffice to make 
the separate crimes related”). 
55 Denis, 633 F.3d at 211 (citing Park, 473 F.3d at 72). 
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connection” requires a link between the alien’s offense and a 
listed federal crime: without the listed federal offense, the 
alien’s offense could not have occurred. 
A “logical connection” is also defined by Denis.  
There, we stated that the obstruction-of-justice offense 
codified at § 1512(c)(1)—which prohibits “corruptly 
alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilate[ing], or conceal[ing] a 
record, document, or other object . . . with the intent to impair 
the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official 
proceeding”—was “directly analogous, and thus, logically 
connected” to New York’s tampering statute because both 
statues focus on “destroying or mutilating evidentiary items 
in anticipation of their potential production in a prospective 
proceeding.”56  So while the New York statute in Denis and 
§ 1512(c)(1) are not a perfect match in terms of prohibited 
conduct, Denis makes clear that the Obstruction Provision 
does not require a precise matching of elements given its 
reference to offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.”  It is 
enough that the two crimes target the same, core criminal 
conduct such that they are “directly analogous.”57 
Accordingly, we reject the Government’s position 
and reaffirm Denis’s central holding: to determine whether a 
petitioner’s prior offense constitutes an aggravated felony 
“relating to obstruction of justice,” we apply a categorical 
approach, seeking a “logical or causal connection” between 
                                                   
56 Id. at 213. 
57 See id.  Indeed, it has been recognized that New York’s 
tampering-with-evidence statute, at issue in Denis, and 
§ 1512(c), while not “mirror images,” are “essentially 
similar.”  In re Coren, 905 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2010). 
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an alien’s offense and a relevant Chapter 73 offense.  
“Logical” means that both an alien’s statute of conviction and 
a Chapter 73 statute are directly analogous; “causal” means 
that, but for a Chapter 73 offense, the alien’s offense could 
not have occurred. 
3. 
Applying this framework reveals that Flores’s 
accessory-after-the-fact conviction is not “relat[ed] to 
obstruction of justice.”  In South Carolina, accessory after the 
fact occurs where the defendant, knowing that a principal has 
committed a felony, “harbor[s] or assist[s] the principal 
felon . . . for the purpose of enabling the principal felon to 
escape detection or arrest.”58  We must compare this South 
Carolina offense to the federal obstruction offenses listed in 
Chapter 73 to determine whether Flores’s conviction is 
“relat[ed] to obstruction of justice.”  Of those offenses, only § 
1503 and § 1512(c)(2) contain language that could arguably 
encompass accessory after the fact. 
Section 1503(a) includes a “catchall” provision 
prohibiting a person from “corruptly or by threats or force . . . 
influenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] 
                                                   
58  Legette, 330 S.E.2d at 294 (citations omitted).  The 
elements of accessory after the fact are: “(1) the felony has 
been completed; (2) the accused must have knowledge that 
the principal committed the felony; and (3) the accused must 
harbor or assist the principal felon.”  Collins, 495 S.E.2d at 
204.  “The assistance or harboring rendered must be for the 
purpose of enabling the principal felon to escape detection or 
arrest.”  Legette, 330 S.E.2d at 294 (citations omitted); Hooks 
v. State, 577 S.E.2d 211, 213 (S.C. 2003), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Gentry, 610 S.E.2d 494 (S.C. 2005). 
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to influence, obstruct or impede, the due administration of 
justice.”59  In Denis, we explained that a New York statute 
prohibiting intentionally tampering with physical evidence to 
prevent its use in an official proceeding 60  was sufficiently 
connected to § 1503 to constitute an aggravated felony 
because both statutes “by their terms, proscribe any behavior 
that entails the use of force in an effort to impede or obstruct 
an official proceeding, such as through evidence 
tampering.”61 
But Flores’s conviction does not bear this same 
type of resemblance to § 1503 and it is therefore not logically 
or causally connected to accessory after the fact.  With 
respect to a logical connection, both the mens rea (“corruptly 
or by threats or force”) and actus reus (“influence[], 
obstruct[] or impede[] . . . the due administration of justice”) 
of § 1503 focus on a defendant’s intent and actions with 
respect to “the due administration of justice.”  The “due 
administration of justice,” we have held, refers to “a judicial 
proceeding,” and not “some ancillary proceeding, distinct 
from a judicial proceeding such as an investigation 
                                                   
59 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). 
60  This New York statute reads: “Believing that certain 
physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an 
official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, and 
intending to prevent such production or use, he suppresses it 
by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction, or by 
employing force, intimidation or deception against any 
person.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 215.40. 
61 Denis, 633 F.3d at 212 (citing cases for the proposition that 
§ 1503 covers evidence tampering). 
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independent of the court’s authority.”62  In stark contrast, the 
mens rea (intending “the principal felon to escape detection 
or arrest”) and actus reus (“harbor[ing] or assist[ing] the 
principal felon”) of Flores’s South Carolina offense focus not 
on a defendant’s intent and actions regarding a particular 
judicial proceeding, but on the principal of a crime.63  Put 
                                                   
62 United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 169 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing 
United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 1999)); see 
also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) 
(holding that “[t]he action taken by the accused must be with 
an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings”).  
We have explained that the elements of a § 1503 offense are: 
“(1) the existence of a judicial proceeding; (2) knowledge or 
notice of the pending proceeding; (3) acting corruptly with 
the intent of influencing, obstructing, or impeding the 
proceeding in the due administration of justice; and (4) the 
action had the ‘natural and probable effect’ of interfering with 
the due administration of justice.”  Sussman, 709 F.3d at 168 
(quoting In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 317 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2001)). 
63 The dissent places much emphasis on our note in Denis that 
New York’s tampering-with-evidence statute applies to 
defendants “regardless of whether the [defendants’] conduct 
interfered with a judicial proceeding or a police 
investigation.”  Op. of Shwartz, J. at 6-7 & n.5 (citing Denis, 
633 F.3d at 212 n.15).  But while a defendant’s conduct need 
not occur during the pendency of a judicial proceeding, the 
New York statute still mandates a concrete link to official 
proceedings: the defendant must “[b]eliev[e] that certain 
physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an 
official proceeding,” and must intend to “prevent such 
production or use.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 215.40; see also 
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another way, these two offenses target completely different 
criminal conduct.  Indeed, there are infinite actions a 
defendant may undertake with the intent to aid the principal 
after the commission of a crime, but before the 
commencement of judicial proceedings, none of which would 
constitute a violation of § 1503, and all of which could 
constitute accessory after the fact.64  So while Denis makes 
clear that the elements of an alien’s offense and a Chapter 73 
offense need not match precisely to fall within the 
Obstruction Provision, 65  they must be “directly analogous” 
such that a “logical connection” exists.  In light of the widely 
                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
People v. Lewis, 901 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2009); 
People v. Berdini, 845 N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
2007); People v. Simon, 547 N.Y.S.2d 199, 203 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 1989).  Here, in contrast, South Carolina accessory after 
the fact requires no such nexus.  See Collins, 495 S.E.2d at 
204.   
In any event, our note in Denis, 633 F.3d at 212 n.15, is 
dictum and does not affect our decision today. 
64 We have held that solely hindering a police investigation—
which is criminalized by South Carolina accessory after the 
fact—plainly does not fall within § 1503’s ambit.  See Davis, 
183 F.3d at 239 (“Courts have repeatedly held that an 
investigation simpliciter is not enough to trigger § 1503.”). 
65 Denis, 633 F.3d at 207, 212-13. 
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divergent elements between accessory after the fact and § 
1503, however, we find no such connection here.66 
With respect to a causal connection, Flores’s 
accessory-after-the-fact offense does not form the basis of a 
§ 1503 conviction, and a § 1503 offense does not form the 
basis of an accessory-after-the-fact conviction.  As discussed, 
these crimes are independent: one may be convicted under 
§ 1503 without ever aiding a principal felon, and one may be 
convicted of South Carolina accessory after the fact without 
ever interfering with a judicial proceeding.  Thus, no causal 
connection exists. 
                                                   
66  The dissent contends that “the purpose of the accessory 
after the fact offense is to help the principal avoid facing 
justice before a court,” and therefore “this conduct is related 
to obstructing the due administration of justice.”  Op. of 
Shwartz, J. at 7.  The dissent’s argument fails for two reasons.  
First, the “administration of justice,” as used in § 1503, means 
a judicial proceeding, see Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, so one 
does not obstruct the “administration of justice” merely by 
making it more difficult for authorities to move forward with 
their investigation; a judicial proceeding is a judicial 
proceeding regardless of how long it takes to commence.  
Second, the dissent’s metaphysical argument echoes the 
Government’s claim (invoking “broad notion[s] of 
‘obstruction of justice’”) and must fail for the same reason: 
the relevant inquiry is not abstract, but must focus on 
Congress’s intent as embodied by the obstruction-of-justice 
statutes in Chapter 73 and the Obstruction Provision.  
Accordingly, the dissent’s cited cases—none of which relate 
to the Obstruction Provision, Denis, or the INA—are 
unavailing.  See Op. of Shwartz, J. at 8.  
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A similar analysis applies to § 1512(c)(2).  That 
provision makes conduct criminal where one “corruptly . . . 
otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official 
proceeding, or attempts to do so.”67   We did not address 
§ 1512(c)(2) in Denis, but we stated that § 1512(c)(1)—which 
prohibits “corruptly alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilat[ing], or 
conceal[ing] a record, document, or other object . . . with the 
intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in 
an official proceeding”—is “directly analogous, and thus, 
logically connected” to New York’s tampering statute 
because both statues focus on “destroying or mutilating 
evidentiary items in anticipation of their potential production 
in a prospective proceeding.”68 
The same cannot be said of Flores’s accessory-
after-the fact conviction and § 1512(c)(2).  As a threshold 
matter, § 1512(c)(2) references “any official proceeding,” not 
a judicial proceeding or the “the due administration of 
justice” as in § 1503.  However, this difference is immaterial 
under United States v. Tyler, 69  which held that “in any 
prosecution brought under a § 1512 provision charging 
obstruction of justice involving an ‘official proceeding,’ the 
government is required to prove a nexus between the 
defendant’s conduct and a particular official proceeding 
before a judge or court of the United States that the defendant 
contemplated.”70  Section 1512(c)(2)—which involves “any 
official proceeding”—clearly falls under our holding in 
                                                   
67 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). 
68 Denis, 633 F.3d at 213. 
69 732 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2013). 
70 Id. at 249-50 (citing Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 
544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005)).   
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Tyler 71  and, therefore, we apply a nexus requirement to 
§ 1512(c)(2).72 
With § 1512(c)(2)’s nexus requirement in mind, 
our analysis of this statute closely mirrors our analysis of § 
1503, as § 1512(c)(2) is neither logically nor causally 
connected to accessory after the fact.  With respect to a 
logical connection, both the mens rea (“corruptly”) and actus 
reus (“obstruct[], influence[], or impede[] any official 
proceeding”) of § 1512(c)(2) focus on a defendant’s intent 
and actions concerning a judicial proceeding.  As noted 
previously, accessory after the fact, in contrast, contains mens 
rea and actus reus elements directed toward a defendant’s 
intent and actions regarding the principal of a crime, not a 
judicial proceeding.  Accordingly, as with § 1503, the widely 
divergent elements between accessory after the fact and § 
1512(c)(2) demonstrate that no logical connection exists. 
                                                   
71  See id. (favorably citing cases that apply the nexus 
requirement to § 1512(c)(2)). 
72 Our sister circuits have also applied a nexus requirement to 
§ 1512(c)(2).  See United States v. Petruk, 781 F.3d 438, 445 
(8th Cir. 2015) (applying the nexus requirement to 
§ 1512(c)(2)); United States v. Bennett, 664 F.3d 997, 1013 
(5th Cir. 2011) (same), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 
71 (2012); United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 
1264 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Carson, 560 
F.3d 566, 584 (6th Cir. 2009) (assuming arguendo that the 
“nexus requirement” applies to §1512(c)(2)); United States v. 
Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J.) 
(applying the nexus requirement to § 1512(c)(2)). 
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Likewise, no causal connection exists between 
accessory after the fact and § 1512(c)(2): Flores’s accessory-
after-the-fact offense does not form the basis of a 
§ 1512(c)(2) conviction, and a § 1512(c)(2) offense does not 
form the basis of an accessory-after-the-fact conviction.  
Thus, like § 1503, no causal connection exists. 
Our conclusion that the Obstruction Provision does 
not capture Flores’s South Carolina conviction is further 
bolstered by a straightforward review of the Obstruction 
Provision’s statutory text and legislative history.  Indeed, at 
bottom, the categorical approach conducted today is merely a 
tool of statutory interpretation73 used to avoid “the practical 
difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach” 
when analyzing prior convictions.74  The categorical approach 
is not talismanic; it does not eclipse or alter our other methods 
                                                   
73  See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 214 (2007) 
(noting that the Court is “engaging in statutory interpretation” 
by employing the categorical approach), overruled on other 
grounds by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); 
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 23 (2005) (clarifying 
application of the modified categorical approach and framing 
the issue as one of statutory interpretation); Ezell v. United 
States, 778 F.3d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing seminal 
Supreme Court cases on the categorical approach as statutory 
interpretation cases), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 256 (2015); 
Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(describing the categorical approach as a method of statutory 
interpretation). 
74 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990). 
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of statutory interpretation.  As always, our “primary purpose 
in statutory interpretation is to discern legislative intent.”75 
The Obstruction Provision, on its face, includes all 
“offense[s] relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or 
subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness.”76  The term 
“obstruction of justice” is not alone, but listed in conjunction 
with “perjury or subornation of perjury” and “bribery of a 
witness.”  “[T]his informs our understanding of Congress’s 
intended interpretation of ‘obstruction of justice.’”77  So while 
“obstruction of justice” may, at its most expansive, be taken 
to include offenses wholly divorced from any judicial 
proceeding,78 the other offenses listed therewith—“perjury or 
subornation of perjury” and “bribery of a witness”—relate 
only to conduct that impedes a judicial proceeding.79  Under 
                                                   
75 Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 2006). 
76 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). 
77 Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 821. 
78 See, e.g., Barlow, 470 F.2d at 1252-53 (“The gist of being 
an accessory after the fact lies essentially in obstructing 
justice by rendering assistance to hinder or prevent the arrest 
of the offender after he has committed the crime.”).  As noted 
previously, this passing statement in Barlow was not in the 
Obstruction Provision context, or even the INA context, and 
the court did not undertake the exhaustive Chapter 73 
categorical analysis necessary here.  It thus has no bearing on 
our decision today. 
79 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3)-(4) (criminalizing bribery of a 
witness); 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (criminalizing perjury); 18 
U.S.C. § 1622 (criminalizing subornation of perjury). 
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such circumstances, the noscitur a sociis canon 80  counsels 
toward a narrower definition of “obstruction of justice” that 
does not reach conduct unmoored from judicial proceedings. 
Moreover, in adding certain categories of offenses, 
like the Obstruction Provision, to the list of aggravated 
felonies in 1996, Congress made an effort “to ensure that the 
overall reach of the definition would be consistent with the 
sentencing guidelines.” 81   Specifically, “[w]ith only certain 
limited exceptions,” Congress “attempted to ensure that all of 
the crimes defined as aggravated felonies carry a base offense 
level of at least 12,” in order “to ensure that only the most 
serious crimes . . . render the alien deportable.”82  But in the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines of the time, “Obstruction 
of Justice” had a base offense level of 12,83 while “Accessory 
After the Fact” had a base offense level as low as 4.84  This 
lends further support to the proposition that Congress did not 
                                                   
80 This canon of statutory interpretation “instructs that when a 
statute contains a list, each word in that list presumptively has 
a ‘similar’ meaning.”  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1089 (2015) 
(Alito, J., concurring); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 
575 (1995).  Put differently, this canon implements the idea 
that the meaning of a word should be determined by 
considering the words with which it is associated in context. 
81 H.R. Rep. No. 104-22, at 7 (1995).   
82 Id. at 7-8.  
83 U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 (1995). 
84 U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1 (1995).   
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intend accessory-after-the-fact offenses to be considered 
aggravated felonies.85 
Consistent with Denis’s categorical approach, and 
our review of the relevant statutory text and legislative 
history, we conclude that Flores’s South Carolina accessory-
                                                   
85 The dissent argues that, under the Sentencing Guidelines, 
accessory-after-the-fact offenses are related to obstruction of 
justice because § 2J1.2 (“Obstruction of Justice”) cross-
references § 2X3.1 (“Accessory After The Fact”).  Op. of 
Shwartz, J. at 8 n.8.  But § 2J1.2’s cross-reference only comes 
into play after § 2J1.2 applies; and § 2J1.2 only applies when 
the defendant has committed a bona fide obstruction-of-
justice offense.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 cmt. n.1 (1995) (“As a 
general rule, the court is to use the guideline section from 
Chapter Two most applicable to the offense of conviction.”); 
see also U.S.S.G. App. A (1995) (listing various statutes 
corresponding to § 2J1.2, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 
1512(c), but not including 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, 4).  Thus, 
§ 2J1.2’s cross-reference is merely used to “punish more 
severely (and to provide a greater disincentive for) . . . 
obstruction of . . . prosecutions with respect to more serious 
crimes.”  United States v. Arias, 253 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 
2001); see also United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 875 
(8th Cir. 2007) (“Although § 2X3.1 normally applies to 
convictions for being an accessory after the fact, in the 
context of the § 2J1.2(c) cross reference provision, it merely 
serves as a tool for calculating the base offense level for 
particularly serious obstruction offenses.”); United States v. 
Kimble, 305 F.3d 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2002) (same).  Section 
2J1.2’s cross-reference is therefore fully consistent with 
Congress’s goal to “ensure that all of the crimes defined as 
aggravated felonies carry a base offense level of at least 12.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 104-22, at 7-8 (1995). 
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after-the-fact conviction is not an offense “relating to 
obstruction of justice” and therefore constitutes neither an 
aggravated felony nor a “particularly serious crime” under the 
INA.  She is therefore eligible for withholding of removal. 
B. 
Flores also seeks review of the BIA’s denial of her 
CAT application.  An applicant for CAT relief must show that 
it is more likely than not that she would be tortured if she 
were removed to her home country,86 and that such torture 
would be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of” a public official.87  Before both 
the IJ and the BIA, Flores asserted that it was “more likely 
than not” that she would face torture if removed.  Before the 
BIA, Flores also stated that she obtained new evidence that 
her father sought to murder her.  But the BIA observed that 
she never provided this new evidence and concluded that she 
failed to “meaningfully challenge[ ] . . . the [IJ’s] denial of 
her application for” CAT relief.88 
In this appeal, Flores does not meaningfully dispute 
the BIA’s conclusion that she failed to appeal the IJ’s ruling 
                                                   
86 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). 
87 Id. § 1208.18(a)(1).   
88 App. 30. 
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on her CAT claim.89  As a result, she did not exhaust her CAT 
claim, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to review it.90  
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
Flores’s accessory after the fact conviction is not a 
“particularly serious crime” within the meaning of the INA 
and she is therefore eligible for withholding of removal.  We 
also conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review Flores’s 
CAT claim.  Accordingly, Flores’s petition is granted in part 
and dismissed in part, the BIA’s decision is vacated in part, 
and the case will be remanded to the BIA for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
                                                   
89 Pet’r’s Br. at 26-27.   
90 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 
120-21 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that a petitioner must raise 
all issues before the BIA to exhaust her administrative 
remedies, and failure to  exhaust all administrative remedies 
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction). 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in 
part. 
 
 I agree with my colleagues that we lack jurisdiction to 
review Patricia Flores’s petition for relief under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) because she did not 
dispute the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) finding 
that she failed to meaningfully challenge the Immigration 
Judge’s (“IJ”) ruling.  However, I part company with my 
colleagues’ conclusion that a conviction under South 
Carolina’s accessory after the fact statute does not constitute 
an aggravated felony.  Applying the framework set forth in 
Denis v. Attorney General, 633 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011), I 
believe we are required to conclude that South Carolina’s 
accessory after the fact offense is related to obstruction of 
justice, and it therefore qualifies as an aggravated felony 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S).  As a result, Flores is not 
entitled to withholding of removal.    
 
I 
 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
provides a list of offenses that are considered aggravated 
felonies.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).  To determine whether a 
state conviction constitutes an aggravated felony under the 
INA, we presumptively apply the “formal categorical 
approach.”  Ng v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Under this approach, we look at the elements of the 
crime to determine whether it falls within a category  
2 
 
enumerated in the INA.1  Id. at 396-97.  In general, “[i]f the 
elements of the aggravated felony generic crimes enumerated 
in the federal statute are the same as or broader than the 
elements of the specific criminal statute of conviction, then 
the specific crime of conviction categorically qualifies as an 
aggravated felony.”  Denis, 633 F.3d at 206.   
 
 One category of aggravated felony under the INA is 
“an offense relating to obstruction of justice . . . for which the 
term of imprisonment is at least one year.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(S).  In Denis, we observed that the phrase 
“relating to” must be “read expansively” and “encompass[es] 
crimes other than those specifically listed in the federal 
statutes.”  Denis, 633 F.3d at 209 (citations omitted); see also 
Yong Wong Park v. Att’y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 72 (3d Cir. 
2006) (noting that the Supreme Court has defined “relating 
to” as: “to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; 
to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection 
with” (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 
374, 383 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Mindful of Congress’s word choice, the Denis court held that 
“in deciding whether a conviction is ‘related to’ another 
offense . . . crimes of conviction can be ‘related to’ a listed 
offense without containing what might be viewed as an 
essential element.”  Denis, 633 F.3d at 210.  Thus, under 
Denis, the elements of the federal statute and the crime of 
conviction need not match for the latter to relate to 
obstruction of justice.  See id. at 211 (stating that “[t]o give 
effect to Congress’s choice of language, a categorical 
                                                          
1 In making this determination, we may not consider 
the particular facts underlying the conviction.  Restrepo v. 
Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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matching of the elements of the offense of conviction with the 
elements of a federal law cannot be the sole test for 
determining whether a crime of conviction ‘relates to’ a 
generic federal offense”).   Rather, a “logical” or “causal 
connection may suffice to make the separate crimes related.”  
Id. at 211-12 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. 
at 212 (“[W]e will survey the interrelationship between [the] 
two statutory provisions and apply the phrase relating to 
broadly, seeking a logical or causal connection.” (second 
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).  Therefore, our task is to determine whether the 
state offense is logically or causally connected with the 
generic federal obstruction of justice offense.2     
                                                          
2 My colleagues impose a much higher standard of 
connection than required in Denis.  For a state offense to be 
logically connected to a federal obstruction of justice offense, 
my colleagues conclude that the offenses must be “directly 
analogous.”  Majority Op. 19-20.  In Denis, we did observe 
that a federal obstruction of justice offense was “directly 
analogous, and thus, logically connected to Denis’s state 
crime of conviction.”  Denis, 633 F.3d at 213.  While it is true 
that the two offenses at issue in Denis were directly 
analogous and that directly analogous offenses are also 
logically connected, nothing in Denis suggests that “direct 
analogy” is the minimum threshold that is required to 
establish a logical connection in every case.  Indeed, the plain 
meaning of the expansive phrase “relating to” in § 
1101(a)(43)(s) shows that Congress did not require that the 
two statutes be “directly analogous” in order to be “related.”  
See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383 (“The ordinary meaning of 
[relating to] is a broad one—‘to stand in some relation; to 
have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into 
4 
 
 Chapter 73 of Title 18 of the United States Code is 
entitled “Obstruction of Justice” and contains more than 
twenty different offenses.3  Most applicable here is 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503, which provides that “[w]hoever corruptly, or by 
threats or force, . . . endeavors to influence, obstruct, or 
impede, the due administration of justice” shall be imprisoned 
(if the obstruction does not involve a killing or attempted 
killing) not more than ten years.  
                                                                                                                                  
association with or connection with,’ . . . .” (quoting Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979))).  Moreover, in Denis 
we emphasized that our precedent takes a broad reading of 
the phrase “relating to.”  Denis, 633 F.3d at 211.  The “direct 
analogy” standard that my colleagues rely upon is more than 
what Denis and the plain meaning of § 1101(a)(43)(s) require.    
 3 My colleagues assert that the placement of the federal 
accessory after the fact section outside of Chapter 73 signifies 
that it is not an obstruction of justice offense.  I do not think 
we can draw such a conclusion.  First, the accessory after the 
fact section, 18 U.S.C. § 3, is placed in the chapter entitled 
“General Provisions,” which includes definitions that are 
applicable throughout the code.  Second, the accessory after 
the fact provision falls immediately after the section that 
addresses principals and aiders and abettors, 18 U.S.C. § 2, 
and before misprision of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4, and conveys 
that it was placed there to make clear that criminal liability 
may be imposed upon certain individuals even after the 
primary offense is completed.  Under § 3’s accessory after the 
fact provision, one may be liable for assisting the offender to 
prevent his apprehension, trial, or punishment.  There is 
nothing in the language of these provisions that suggests that 
one who commits such an offense could not also commit a 
Chapter 73 obstruction of justice offense. 
5 
 
 
 We have held that obstruction of the “due 
administration of justice” under § 1503 requires an ongoing 
judicial proceeding.  United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 
239 (3d Cir. 1999).4  Denis makes clear, however, that the 
elements of the crime of conviction and the federal offense 
need not precisely match for the conduct to be logically or 
causally connected to obstruction of justice.  See Denis, 633 
F.3d at 206-07 (stating that § 1101(a)(43)(S)’s inclusion of 
the words “relating to obstruction of justice” makes the 
                                                          
 4 The elements of § 1503 are: 
(1) the existence of a judicial proceeding; (2) 
knowledge or notice of the pending proceeding; 
(3) acting corruptly with the intent of 
influencing, obstructing, or impeding the 
proceeding in the due administration of justice; 
and (4) the action had the ‘natural and probable 
effect’ of interfering with the due administration 
of justice. 
United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 168 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted).  Interfering with an investigation 
conducted by an executive agency, such as the FBI, does not 
violate the “due administration of justice” clause because 
those agencies “are not judicial arms of the government 
‘administering justice.’” United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 
206, 208 (3d Cir. 1979).  Thus, obstruction of an event 
“distinct from a judicial proceeding such as an investigation 
independent of the court’s  . . . authority,” Sussman, 709 F.3d 
at 169 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), does 
not violate § 1503.   
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provision “more descriptive in nature and, thus, slightly more 
expansive. . .  . [R]ather than ascertaining whether the 
elements of a state crime of conviction match the elements of 
the generic federal offense with precision, we must only 
decide that the state conviction ‘relates to’ the offense 
criminalized by § 1101(a)(43)(S), namely, obstruction of 
justice.”).   Thus, my colleagues’ focus on the individual 
elements of § 1503 and, in particular, the element that 
requires proof of an ongoing judicial proceeding is 
inconsistent with Denis.  Indeed, in Denis we explicitly 
rejected the argument that a crime of conviction must require 
an ongoing judicial proceeding in order to relate to 
obstruction of justice.  There, we reviewed the elements of 
the New York state evidence tampering statute and concluded 
that it “related to” the offense set forth in § 1503 because both 
statutes “proscribe any behavior that entails the use of force 
in an effort to impede or obstruct an official proceeding, such 
as through evidence tampering.”  Id. at 212 (footnote 
omitted).  We explained that, although the New York statute 
applied “regardless of whether the conduct interfered with a 
judicial proceeding or a police investigation, and [§] 1503 
only pertains to obstruction of judicial proceedings, this 
distinction does not defeat our ‘relating to’ analysis” because 
“our approach does not depend upon matching the elements 
of the state crime of conviction with the elements of [§] 
1503.”  Id. at 212 n.15 (citations omitted).5  Instead, “we only 
                                                          
5 My colleagues characterize this statement in Denis as 
dictum.  Majority Op. 22 n.63.  However, in Denis, we held 
that the New York state evidence tampering statute “related 
to” § 1503 even though the New York statute could apply in 
the absence of a pending judicial proceeding.  633 F.3d at 
212.  Therefore, in Denis, we necessarily held that the 
7 
 
consider[ed] the provision to identify the nature of offenses 
classified as obstruction of justice under federal law for 
purposes of conducting the ‘relating to’ examination.”  Id.    
 
 With this in mind, I conclude that the absence of a 
pending judicial proceeding requirement does not mean South 
Carolina’s accessory after the fact crime is unrelated to 
obstruction of justice.  Under South Carolina law, the crime 
of accessory after the fact may be committed where the 
defendant, knowing the principal committed a felony, 
“harbor[s] or assist[s] the principal felon . . . for the purpose 
of enabling the principal felon to escape detection or arrest.”  
State v. Legette, 330 S.E.2d 293, 294 (S.C. 1985) (citations 
omitted).6  Such an offense impedes law enforcement’s 
efforts to apprehend wrongdoers and prevents courts and 
                                                                                                                                  
absence of a pending judicial proceeding was not dispositive 
of the “relating to” analysis.  My colleagues suggest that the 
state crime at issue must nonetheless have a “nexus” to an 
official proceeding.  Majority Op. 22 n.63.  In Denis, 
however, we made no mention of such a nexus requirement.  
Given the result in Denis, we cannot now conclude that the 
absence of a judicial proceeding requirement in South 
Carolina’s accessory after the fact crime necessarily defeats 
any relationship to § 1503.   
6 The Legette court described the elements of 
accessory after the fact as follows “(1) the felony has been 
completed; (2) the accused must have knowledge that the 
principal committed the felony; and (3) the accused must 
harbor or assist the principal felon.  The assistance or 
harboring rendered must be for the purpose of enabling the 
principal felon to escape detection or arrest.”  Legette, 330 
S.E.2d at 294 (citations omitted). 
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juries from considering criminal charges against them.  Given 
that the purpose of the accessory after the fact offense is to 
help the principal avoid facing justice before a court, this 
conduct is related to obstructing the due administration of 
justice.7  Indeed, our court and others have recognized that 
accessory after the fact is, by definition, an obstruction of 
justice.  See Gov’t of V.I. v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 553 (3d 
Cir. 1967) (“An accessory after the fact is one who, knowing 
that a crime has been committed, obstructs justice by giving 
comfort or assistance to the offender in order to hinder or 
prevent his apprehension or punishment.”); see also United 
States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1286 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(“The gist of being an accessory after the fact lies essentially 
in obstructing justice by rendering assistance to hinder or 
prevent the arrest of the offender after he has committed the 
crime.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
                                                          
7 My colleagues criticize this analysis as being overly 
“abstract” and criticize the Government’s approach for 
improperly “invoking broad notion[s] of obstruction of 
justice.”  Majority Op. 24 n.66 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  However, this “broad” approach is exactly what is 
required by the “relating to” analysis set forth in binding 
precedent.  See Denis, 633 F.3d at 212 (explaining that we 
“apply the phrase ‘relating to’ broadly, seeking a logical or 
causal connection”); Yong Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 72 (noting 
the “broad reach of the term ‘relating to[ ]’”); Drakes v. 
Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that 
Congress’s inclusion of the phrase “relating to” evidenced 
“an intent to define [the listed offense] in its broadest sense”); 
see also Morales, 504 U.S. at 383 (noting that “[t]he ordinary 
meaning of [‘relating to’] is a broad one”).  My colleagues’ 
approach reads “relating to” out of the statute.    
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United States v. Brown, 33 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(same); United States v. Willis, 559 F.2d 443, 444 (5th Cir. 
1977) (same); United States v. Barlow, 470 F.2d 1245, 1252-
53 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (same).8 
                                                          
8 Moreover, contrary to my colleagues’ interpretation, 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines support the view that 
accessory after the fact is logically connected with 
obstruction of justice.  The background portion of the 
application notes to the obstruction of justice guideline states 
that  
 
[b]ecause the conduct covered by this guideline 
is frequently part of an effort to avoid 
punishment for an offense that the defendant 
has committed or to assist another person to 
escape punishment for an offense, a cross-
reference to §2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact) 
is provided.  Use of this cross reference will 
provide an enhanced offense level when the 
obstruction is in respect to a particularly serious 
offense, whether such offense was committed 
by the defendant or another person.   
 
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt. background; see also U.S.S.G. § 
2J1.2(c)(1) (stating that “[i]f the offense involved obstructing 
the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, apply 
§2X3.1 (Accessory After the Fact) in respect to that criminal 
offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that 
determined” by applying the provisions of § 2J1.2).  Thus, 
while conviction for an offense under Chapter 73 can trigger 
§ 2J1.2, the Sentencing Commission has acknowledged that 
one who is an accessory after the fact may obstruct justice 
10 
 
  For these reasons, Denis requires us to conclude that 
Flores’s conviction for accessory after the fact under South 
Carolina law is “related to” the obstruction of justice, and that 
the BIA appropriately designated Flores as an aggravated 
felon.  Because Flores committed an aggravated felony for 
which she was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, she has 
committed a “particularly serious crime” and is ineligible for 
withholding of removal.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). 
 
II 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, I join my colleagues in 
dismissing Flores’s CAT claim for lack of jurisdiction, but 
under Denis I would be compelled to deny her petition for 
review of her application for withholding of removal.   
                                                                                                                                  
and, in such circumstances, should be treated as if he or she 
committed an obstruction of justice offense.   
